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Abstract: This paper estimates the effects of the compulsory voting laws on individuals´ 
political orientations though a regression discontinuity framework. The identification comes 
from Brazil´s dual voting system – voluntary and compulsory – whose exposure is determined 
based on citizens’ dates of birth. Using self-collected data, we find that compulsory voting has 
sizable effects on individuals´ political preferences, making them more likely to identify with 




Democracy lies in the heart of political economy (Downs 1957). Most democratic countries 
have a voluntary voting system; it is, however, debatable whether voting should be mandatory 
(Lijphart 1997). Compulsory voting is in place in 34 countries, and despite a recent growing 
literature, still little is known about the effects of this controversial voting system: whether it 
affects election outcomes and how it changes the electorate’s political views. In this paper, we 
address this last question and provide estimates of the causal effect of compulsory voting on 
individuals’ degree of political polarization and political preferences. 
The evidence is based on the Brazil’s unique dual-voting system. Individuals between 16 
and 18 years of age are entitled to vote, while those older than 18 are by law required to vote.1 
We use data from a self-collected survey among young adults exposed to either system, 
conducted just after the 2010 presidential election in Brazil. We quantify the reduced form of 
the effect of voting participation by adopting a sharp regression discontinuity (RD) framework 
                                                 
1 Stronger sanctions are applied to those who fail to vote and are under compulsory voting. These will be explained 
in Section 2. 
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and looking at differences around the age of 18.  Our estimates show how political preferences 
change in the transition from a voluntary to a compulsory voting system. We provide strong 
statistical evidence for these effects, thus contributing to the open debate among academics and 
the public regarding the consequences of a forced democracy (Krasa and Polborn 2009; 
Krishna and Morgan 2011; Borgers 2004; Ghosal and Lockwood 2009).    More generally, our 
findings add to the understanding of the effects of voting participation on political preferences. 
The requirement of having to vote may affect citizens' level of political interest and, 
consequently, consumption of information and political preferences (Gerber et al. 2010). In 
this case, initiatives that encourage voting participation may in fact affect the citizenry’s 
political orientations and contribute to polarization. In voting models that assume a cost-benefit 
calculus (Downs 1957; Coate and Conlin 2004; Degan 2006), political engagement and 
preferences are often assumed to be exogenous and determinants of electoral participation. In 
this paper, we test the opposite causal channel: whether these parameters respond to an 
exogenous change in voting turnout. 
    The identification of causal effects of turnout participation is challenging, giving that 
unobservables, such as intrinsic political interest, determine both voter turnout rates and other 
political outcomes. The literature adopts several approaches to identify these impacts. These 
approaches rely on field experiments that induce voting participation (León 2015; Gerber et al. 
2010; Loewen et al. 2008). Other studies exploit changes in voting costs to identify the 
determinants and consequences of turnout (León 2015; Funk 2010). Gomez et al. (2007) and 
Hansford and Gomez (2010) examine variations in weather conditions on Election Day to 
establish a causal relationship between voting participation and election results at the US 
county level. They find that bad weather leads to lower turnout and helps Republicans to gain 
votes. Hansford and Gomez (2010) use an IV approach, explaining US presidential candidates' 
vote shares with turnout that is instrumented by Election Day rainfall. They predict that a 4% 
change in turnout leads to a change in the Democrat Party’s vote share at the national level of 
around one percentage point. These large effects suggest that increases in voting participation 
can result in different election results. Godefroy and Henry (2013) use a similar strategy and 
data from French municipalities to uncover the relationship between turnout and implemented 
post-election policies. Hodler et al. (2015) examine the consequences of the introduction of 
voting via post in Switzerland, which resulted in increases in turnout. They find that this policy 




    This paper investigates the relationship between voting participation and political 
preferences at the individual level and in the context of the compulsory voting legislation. 
Similarly to this paper, León (2015) quantifies the effects of a lessening of penalties related to 
voting abstention in Peru, where voting is compulsory. In a field experiment, he provided 
information about the change in the penalties and found significantly lower voter turnouts as a 
result of that intervention. However, he did not detect changes in individuals' preferences for 
specific policies. 
   Another part of the literature exploits variation ion individuals' voting age eligibility to 
identify the relationship between voting participation and political preferences. Mullainathan 
and Washington (2009) find that individuals eligible to vote (20-21 year olds) who are affiliated 
with the same party as the president evaluate him as two times better than non-eligible 
individuals (18-19 year olds) with the same party affiliation do two years after the election. 
Focusing on a field experiment, Gerber et al. (2010) find that unaffiliated registered voters 
strengthened their party identity after receiving the information that they need to register with 
a party to vote in a US primary election. Using an RD framework and exploring voting-age 
restrictions in the United States, Meredith (2009) finds that voting eligibility increases 
individuals' future chances of  party registration in California. These studies illustrate only part 
of the voting effects. It is plausible that the opportunity to vote affects only those who are 
willing to participate in elections. The estimated voting effects reported in this paper are more 
compelling and unanticipated, as they are based on exposure to a compulsory voting system, 
affecting those who choose to abstain during elections. 
    Our estimated effects of the transition from a voluntary to a compulsory voting system are 
also important, because they contribute to the literature on the evaluation of voting systems. A 
large number body of studies is focused on predicting election outcomes under full turnout,2 
arguably the most important consequence of the compulsory voting legislation. Citrin et al. 
(2003) and Brunell and DiNardo (2004) predict the ballot choices of non-voters based on the 
choice of voters with similar demographics, and they then forecast election results under full 
participation. A key problem in extrapolating these results, for understanding the impacts of 
compulsory voting legislation, is that none of the literature considers a potential change in 
preferences owing to compulsory voting. The data used in this paper are ideal for shedding 
                                                 
2 The literature has mixed results. While early studies conclude that changes in turnout would not cause significant 
changes in election outcomes (Citrin et al. 2003; Brunell and DiNardo 2004; Highton and Wolfinger 2001), others 
predict important changes (Martinez and Gill 2005; Gomez et al. 2007; Hansford and Gomez 2010). 
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light on this issue. They also provide empirical validation for a key assumption – that 
ideological preferences are fixed – in voting models that investigate welfare implications of 
voting systems (Krasa and Polborn 2009; Krishna and Morgan 2011; Borgers 2004; Ghosal 
and Lockwood 2009).3,4 
    We find that, when passing from a voluntary to a compulsory voting system, individuals 
become 2-4 percentage points (pps) more likely to self-declare themselves as extremely left-
wing oriented and become 5-8 pps more likely to align with a specific party (PSDB- Partido 
da Social Democracia Brasileira). We do not find evidence that these effects are related to 
individuals’ information gains or increases in their senses of political civism. Considering that 
our identification strategy relies on a comparison of individuals who are almost identical in age 
(and presumably indistinguishable by politicians), it is also unlikely that the results are driven 
by political parties targeting young voters in their campaigns. 
    In addition, we find that individuals change their minds about the characteristics they find 
to be important in an ideal candidate. Perhaps surprisingly, "charisma" becomes at least twice 
more likely to be cited as the most important characteristic in an ideal politician with the 
transition from voluntary to a compulsory voting system. This suggests that changes in political 
orientations might to some extent be explained by internal thought processes triggered by the 
obligation to vote. Individuals might think more about the election and re-evaluate their 
assessments of candidates’ characteristics, political parties and their stands on policy issues. 
       This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of Brazilian politics. 
In Section 3, we explain the data and the method, and we present the results in Section 4. We 
discuss and conclude in Section 5. 
                                                 
3 The conclusion in this literature is also mixed. Krasa and Polborn (2009) assume an environment wherein voters 
do not face uncertainty regarding candidates' characteristics, only regarding their voting costs, and decide their 
votes based on ideology. They show that mandatory voting outperforms voluntary voting if the expected absolute 
sizes of the candidates' supporting groups are sufficiently different. In contrast, Krishna and Morgan (2011) add 
competence as an extra dimension of politicians' characteristics. They assume that voters choose between two 
candidates based on ideology and competence and show that, with voluntary and costly voting, turnout adjusts 
endogenously (as voters on different ideological sides perceive different values in electing candidates fielded by 
their parties), so the most competent candidate is always elected. In a compulsory system, on the other hand, 
elections are decided purely on an ideological basis and, differently from voluntary voting, welfare is not always 
maximized. 
4 Other literature, which also assumes fixed preferences, provides a link between voting turnout and political rents 
(Aldashev 2015; Hodler et al. 2015). Aldashev (2015) develops a probabilistic-voting model that finds that 
ideological neutral citizens are less likely to vote. Under compulsory voting, they are brought into the electorate, 





2. Brazil’s political institutions 
       As mentioned, Brazil has a dual voting system. Individuals between 16 and 18 years old 
(or older than 70 years) are entitled to vote, while those older than 18 (and younger than 70 
years) are required to vote by law. All voters must register and registration is compulsory for 
Brazilians between 18 and 70 years of age. In election years, citizens planning to vote are 
required to register at least 150 days before Election Day. No fee is charged and individuals 
are granted an authorized absence from work of up to two days in order to register. When 
individuals who are required to vote fail to do so and fail to provide justification for their 
abstention to the electoral authority, they must pay a small fine.5 
      Stronger sanctions are applied to those who fail to vote in three consecutive elections. They 
are not allowed to issue or renew their passports or national identity cards; they also become 
ineligible for public education, public jobs, cash transfer programs, and credit from state-
owned financial institutions. 
    Mandatory voting was introduced in Brazil in 1932, when the country's first Electoral Code 
was created following the Revolution of 1930.6 In 1964, a coup d'etat initiated a period of 21 
years of military rule in the country, during which the regime controlled the electoral process 
according to its interests through a series of institutional acts, constitutional amendments, laws, 
and decrees. Direct elections for president, governors, and mayors of strategic municipalities 
were suspended, and existing political parties were again banned. A new transition to 
democracy began in 1985, when a constitutional amendment re-established direct elections in 
the country, reinstating the right to vote for those older than 18 and the literacy test for voting 
was abolished. In 1988, the current Brazilian Constitution was promulgated, adopting 
                                                 
5 The fine is R$ 3.51 or approximately 1 USD, according to 2015 values. 
6 One of the principles of the Revolution was the normalization of the electoral system. One of the first acts of the 
provisional government was the creation of a commission to reform the electoral legislation. Advances in the 
electoral legislation were subsequently included in the Constitution of 1934; in 1937, however, a new constitution 
was imposed by President Vargas to extinguish the Electoral Justice, thus dissolving the existing political parties 
and suspending direct elections. The deposition of President Vargas in 1945 marked the re-democratization of the 
country, with the reestablishment of the Electoral Justice System and the restoration of rights suppressed in 1937. 
At that time, voting once again became mandatory for all citizens over 18, except for military officers and citizens 
over 65 years (illiterates were not allowed to register). 
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compulsory voting for literate individuals between 18 and 69 years of age and voluntary voting 
for the remaining citizens (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral -TSE).7 
    The 1988 constitution also stipulated that the Federative Republic of Brazil is a legal 
democratic state. Both the federal government and the governments of Brazil's 26 states consist 
of executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Executive power is wielded by the President of 
the Republic. The National Congress, which consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Federal Senate, is in charge of the legislative power. Brazil has a multi-party system. In 2013, 
the total number of parties was 32. However, most of the elected politicians are affiliated with 
fewer than ten of them. Table 1 shows the number of seats held by members of the Chamber 
of Deputies, presented by party and their ideological positioning, as a result of the 2010 
election.89 
     Most of the seats were held by parties in the center (63.5%), followed by the left (28%) and 
the right (8.4%). There are four main parties at the national level: the left Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT), center-oriented Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (PMDB), 
center-left Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), and the center-right Democratas 
(DEM). In the 2010 election, the three main presidential candidates, Dilma Rousseff, Jose 
Serra, and Marina Silva, were affiliated respectively with the PT, PSDB, and PV parties. The 
PV party is the less representative among them (as shown in Table 1). It is a party whose main 




3. Data and method 
 
                                                 
7 www.tse.jus.br/internet/ingles/historia_eleicoes/eleicoes_brasil.htm 
8 In Table 1 and as discussed in the text, we show the party ideological classification as described in the Wikipedia 
page of political parties. Because Wikipedia pages are constantly monitored by parties, this information is most 
likely to be reliable. There is a strong resemblance between this measure and the party ideological classification 
made by Brazilian political scientists (Carreirao 2006). 
9 Representatives sitting in the Chamber of Deputies and the State Assemblies are elected by direct ballot in an 




       The data come from a self-collected survey of 5,559 students in 109 classrooms in eight 
schools in the city of São Paulo, Brazil. This is the same data used in the analysis by Leon and 
Rizzi (2014). Participants are senior high school students (13.1%), college freshmen (20.3%), 
and students in the transition between high school and college (66.6%). On average, 67.6% 
have a mother with a college degree, 57% are female, and 76% are white. This group is a non-
random sample of Brazil’s younger population and, hence, some selection sample bias might 
be present, although in aggregate, the voting turnout participation by the age group in our 
sample is very similar to the Brazilian population (Leon and Rizzi 2014). 
     Participants were not informed about the specific purpose of the questionnaires, except for 
its title, "Young Adults' Political Behavior", and that the survey was associated with the 
Universidade de São Paulo. The survey (October 4-7) was conducted a few days after the 2010 
Brazilian presidential election (October 3, 2010). The timing of the data collection is 
appropriate, as people are likely to think about politics and evaluate their own political views 
near an election. Using these data and an RD approach, as reported in Leon and Rizzi, we find 
that exposure to the compulsory voting system resulted in a large increase in individuals' voting 
participation, of between 34% and 40%. 
    In this article, we ask whether changes in the degree of political polarization and voter 
preferences are also observed, focusing on the following outcomes. First, we created an 
indicator for those who answered positively to the survey question: "Do you have a preference 
for a political party?" Second, we recorded whether a respondent self-declared as being center-
oriented (as opposed to moderately or extremely right- or left-wing). Then, we created a 
polarization index to account for the different degrees of polarization. This variable assumes a 
value of 0 if the respondent declared being center-oriented, 1 if the respondent declared as 
moderate, and 2 if the respondent declared to be extreme. To understand whether "directional" 
changes in ideological positioning exist, we constructed a five-point right-wing index coded 
from -2 (if the respondent declared to be extreme left-wing), -1 (moderate left-wing), 0 (center-
oriented), +1 (moderate right-wing), and +2 (right-wing). Based on these previous questions, 
we also created indicators for whether an individual declared to be extreme-oriented to the left 
or to the right as well as their specific party preference. We focused on the preference for three 
political parties, PSDB, PT, and PV, because 87.5% of participants with a party preference 
were aligned with one of them. More specifically, 55% of them prefer the PSDB, 12.8% prefer 
the PT party, and 19.7% prefer the PV party. The remaining respondents declared preference 
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for the PSOL (7.9%), PMDB (1%), DEM (0.2%), and other various parties. We abstract from 
those last cases because of small numbers, making it difficult to identify any effect. 
    We focused on a sample of 3,027 students who were between 16.75 and 19.25 years old on 
Election Day 2010 (sufficiently close to the cutoff) and who answered the political preference 




    Voters are more polarized (less likely to be center-oriented and more likely to prefer a 
political party) than non-voters. They are also more likely to assert preferences for the PSDB 
and PT parties. These differences can cause, be caused by voting, or both. 
    To overcome this endogeneity issue and estimate the causal effects of electoral participation, 
we use a regression discontinuity framework. The Brazilian compulsory voting legislation 
increases the cost of abstention. It provides an exogenous shift in individuals' likelihood of 
voting at the age of 18. Assuming no other change at the cutoff age (as will be discussed below), 
a discontinuity in political preferences revealed by the comparison of individuals on either side 
of the 18-year-old threshold should be consequence of the change in the voting system – from 
voluntary to compulsory – and its induced increase in voting participation. The estimates for δ 
in equation 1 (below) are most likely to be causal because the probability an individual falls 
below or above the 18-year threshold and, thus, exposure to the treatment (of the compulsory 
voting legislation), is determined as if it was generated by a random process. Hence, around 
the cutoff, the exposure to the compulsory voting legislation is independent of unobservables 
determining both turnout participation and political behavior. 
    The key condition for identification in RD regressions is that no other relevant changes occur 
at the cutoff age. We argued this to be the case in Leon and Rizzi (2014). We followed the 
guidelines of Lee and Lemieux (2010) and tested for possible confounding effects. We 
estimated equation (1) below using several covariates, such as demographic and family 
characteristics, as endogenous variables to test for other “shocks” at the age of 18. We did not 
detect statistically significant changes for most variables. Another potential threat lies in the 
fact that effects are identified at the age of 18, when youngsters reach the age of legal majority. 
We obviously accept that new opportunities and responsibilities which become available might 
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change individuals, but this happens gradually and not abruptly at the 18th birthday. We tested 
whether students changed their behavior regarding their propensity to apply for college 
admission exams or to respond seriously to the survey at the threshold. In line with our 
expectations, none of these behavioral changes materialized. These results are reported in Leon 
and Rizzi (2014) and in Table A1 in the Appendix for the sample used in this paper (that further 
focuses  on individuals who answered the political question). 
We follow the guidelines of Lee and Lemieux (2010), and we estimate equation 1 to quantify 
the main effects: 
 
y_i =  α + βX_i + M(age) + δ(age≧18) + θ + u_i,   (1) 
 
where y_i represents the outcome of individual i; X_i contains a number of covariates 
(indicators for gender, race, and mother’s education, as well as for whether the individual has 
voted before), θ are school fixed effects, δ(age≧18) is a dummy indicating whether the student 
had turned 18 by the 2010 election, M(age) is a polynomial in age (measured by the distance 
in days to the 18th birthday) that is flexible on each side of the cutoff. It is supposed to better 
control for age effects within the sample and to estimate the effect of interest robustly. The 




4.1 Effects of compulsory voting on party and ideological preferences 
 
       Table 3 presents the OLS estimates for the δ coefficient, which represents the effect of the 
compulsory voting legislation. Each entry in columns 2-4 represents results from a separate 
regression. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), we present the results for several age 
polynomials and for the optimal age polynomial according to the Akaike criterion. 
    In the first and second rows, we report the results using as a dependent variable an indicator 
for whether the individual self-declared to be center-oriented and for the polarization index, 
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respectively. The estimates do not reveal any discontinuity around the 18-year old threshold. 
The estimated coefficients for any of the tested specifications are not statistically significant 
(p-value > 25%). In the third row, we report the results for political party preference and find 
some evidence of such an effect. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, but 
only for the specification controlling for a quadratic age polynomial. In this case, the coefficient 
indicates an increase in this likelihood of 9.83 percentage points (or 34%) at the 18-year old 
threshold. 
    In rows (4)-(9), we look for whether exposure to compulsory voting leads to directional 
effects on ideological positioning. We find evidence that it does, as shown in Table 3, rows 4, 
5 and 7. The estimates in row 5 indicate that individuals become significantly more likely to 
self-declare to be extreme leftwing (between 2 and 4 percentage points). Row 7 shows that 
compulsory voting leads to an increase in the likelihood of asserting a preference for the PSDB 
party by 5 to 8.6 percentage points. In the results not shown in this paper, we find that these 
directional results (in rows 4, 5 and 7) are also robust to local linear regressions using different 
bandwidths. The findings are supported by graphical analysis, presented in the supplementary 
material. The figures clearly indicate discontinuities in political preferences when individuals 
move from voluntary to compulsory voting. 
    In summary, the findings in Table 3 indicate changes in the population's political positioning 
resulting from exposure to compulsory voting. These results are in line with those in Hansford 
and Gomez (2010) and suggest that the adoption of this voting legislation would favor leftwing 
parties. These results are not especially driven by lower-income individuals, who are also less 
likely to vote. In Table A2 in the Appendix, we show the results from Table 3 categorized by 
income. 
    With the estimates from equation 1, we can conduct counterfactuals to quantify how the 
PSDB party would be affected if the transition from voluntary to compulsory voting was to be 
delayed and occur at the age of 19 (after individuals reach majority) instead of at 18. According 
to our estimates, the predicted proportion of individuals that prefer the PSDB party among 
youngsters between 17 and 20 years old (comprising 7.6% of the total voting population 
according to the TSE) is 18.5%. If the compulsory voting age were to be moved to 19, this 
support would fall to 16.3%.10 
                                                 
10 The estimates use the sample of individuals between 16.75 and 19.2 years old and the empirically optimal age 






4.2 Effects of compulsory voting on political preferences and information acquisition 
 
       Next, we check whether the exposure to the compulsory voting legislation affects other 
measures of political engagement and information acquisition as likely explanations for the 
impacts reported in Table 3. The obligation to vote might makes people more likely to become 
engaged in politics, moving them toward a more polarized position. Having to vote may trigger 
senses of responsibility and involvement in politics. We asked participants to rate how aligned 
they feel, on a scale of zero (less aligned) to ten (most aligned), with the following statement: 
"I feel good while voting because I am exerting my civic duty." In Table 4, row 1, we present 
the estimates of δ when using this self-assessment scale as a dependent variable. We do not 
detect an effect of compulsory voting in determining this variable. 
    Another possibility is that individuals actively consume more information because they are 
required to vote. Assume that citizens vote for expressive reasons and that they perceive a cost 
of making a voting mistake (Matsusaka 1995; Degan 2006). They may become more likely to 
consume political information under compulsory voting (CV) than in a voluntary voting system 
because, under CV, citizens can no longer abstain, remain uninformed, and avoid the cost of 
making a voting mistake.11 The polarization and change in political preferences may be the 
result of such a gain in information. We tested for this possible channel by checking whether 
the participants' number of mistakes on the political quiz regarding each of the main three 
presidential candidates – Rousseff (PT), Serra (PSDB), and Silva (PT) – changes in a 
discontinuous manner at the age of 18. The results are reported in Table 4, rows (2)-(4). Again, 
we do not find any statistically significant results for any specification. In Leon and Rizzi 
(2014), we report the results for a number of other knowledge and consumption of information 
variables, and, as in Table 4, rows (2)-(4), we find no statistically significant result. 
                                                 
11 In their models, the perceived cost of making a voting mistake prevent individuals from marking their ballots 
randomly. Citizens behave as if voting is an ethical issue, in the sense that they decide between: voting well or 







    Despite these findings, it might be that individuals reflect more about politics given the 
information they have on hand. This is not directly testable (we do not have information on 
how much time and effort participants allocate to thinking about politics), but we examine 
whether individuals change the way they evaluate politicians' characteristics. We asked 
participants to rank several qualities of an ideal politician (president and mayor) among four 
alternatives. To understand whether and how these preferences change, we create indicators 
for whether the respondent chose a specific characteristic as the most important one. As shown 
in Table 4, column 1, rows (5)-(8), the most cited characteristics of an ideal president among 
voters under a voluntary voting system are (i) competence and intelligence (43.4%), (ii) 
honesty and integrity (42.1%), (iii) genuine care about the people (17.8%), and (iv) charisma 
(2.7%).12 
    Table 4, columns (2)-(4), show results from estimates of equation (1), using each of these 
dummies as dependent variables. We find that charisma becomes 7 percentage points more 
likely to be cited as the most important characteristic in an ideal president (row 8) when citizens 
are under compulsory voting. The size of this effect is large. It is cited three times more often 
as the most important quality in a president among compulsory voters (9.7%) than among 
voluntary voters (2.7%). In rows (9)-(12), we find a similar pattern for the impact of 
compulsory voting on the most important characteristic in a mayor. Individuals become 5.9 
percentage points more likely to mention charisma as the most important characteristic in an 
ideal mayor. We find some weak evidence of the effect of compulsory voting for other 
characteristics. For some specifications, we find that honesty and integrity becomes more likely 
to cited (row 10, column 2), while competence and intelligence become less likely to be cited 




                                                 




5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
       In this paper, we document the short-term effects of compulsory voting in determining 
individuals' political positioning. We explore a quasi-experimental design that exogenously 
assigns people to different voting systems: voluntary and compulsory. Similar to this paper, 
Meredith (2009) uses an RD approach comparing future political party alignments for 
individuals who are almost eligible (are almost 18 years old) with those that are just eligible to 
vote in the United States. Meredith (2009) finds that 2000-eligible voters became 2 percentage 
points more likely to be registered with a party and to be registered as a Democrat. We find 
that, upon being exposed to the compulsory voting legislation, individuals become 2-4 
percentage points more likely to self-declare an extreme-left orientation and 5-8 percentage 
points more likely to express a preference for the PSDB party in the 2010 Brazilian election. 
    A plausible explanation for our findings is that this is a consequence of party strategic 
behavior. For example, parties might be targeting coming-of-age voters with political 
campaigns (Huber and Arceneaux 2007). We are unaware of such campaigns, and national 
polls (e.g., IBOPE - Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística, 2010) do not reveal 
differences in preferences across relevant age groups. In addition, our identification strategy 
most likely rules out this explanation as a possible reason for our findings. Our results rely on 
the comparison of individuals who are almost 18 years old with those who are just 18 by the 
time of the election. They are presumably identical, on average, regarding their policy 
preferences and indistinguishable by parties. 
    We tested whether the change in political preferences is a consequence of individuals' 
gaining information or increasing their senses of civic duty, triggered by the requirement of 
having to vote. The new information acquired could lead to an update about which party/side 
best represents individuals' interests and to an explanation for a change in preferences. We do 
not find supportive evidence for this hypothesis. Alternatively, it is also possible that the 
obligation to vote makes individuals pay closer attention to politics and to reflect more on what 
they are looking for in candidates, despite not consuming more political information. We find 
that, in addition to changing their preferences toward political parties and ideological positions, 
individuals update their evaluations of the characteristics they find to be more important in an 
ideal candidate. This supports the explanation that the compulsory voting legislation makes 
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citizens think more about politics. This may also explain the observed changes in their political 
preferences. 
   Remarkably, we find robust evidence that charisma is more likely to be cited as the most 
important characteristic in an ideal candidate than other traits that are more commonly 
associated with higher-quality politicians, such as competence, honesty, and genuine care about 
the people. This result resonates with the discussion of welfare implications of high voter 
turnouts. Hodler et al. (2015) show that the implementation of postal voting in Switzerland was 
associated with changes in electorate characteristics and less spending on welfare programs by 
elected politicians. They interpret this finding in the context of a voting model in which 
candidates’ policy stances respond to the composition of the electorate. Initiatives that lower 
voting costs (like postal voting or compulsory voting) lead to an increase in the proportion of 
impressionable voters whose ballot choices are more sensitive to campaigns (and charismatic 
candidates) than to policy platforms. As a consequence, candidates propose parochial policies 
that might not be optimal for all citizens in society. In this paper, we find that charisma becomes 
a more important characteristic in an ideal politician, suggesting that (at least) the young 
electorate is more impressionable under compulsory rather than under voluntary voting. It is 
possible that this effect is reinforced by the “supply of politicians”, that itself reacts to the 
preferences of the electorate. Recently, many celebrities have run for election and some of 
them have been elected with a considerable number of votes.13 As discussed in the media (Frota 
2014), although these public figures from the entertainment business are viewed with 
skepticism by most of the population, they are becoming more common in the political arena. 
With the goal of gaining seats in the national legislature, political parties approach both 
experienced politicians and celebrities to run for office, so as to ensure a larger number of votes 
in the next congress.  
    Worth mentioning is the fact that this research has some important limitations in terms of its 
external validity. The effects are quantified among young citizens who are still developing their 
political preferences (Prior 2010; Sears and Funk 2010; Franklin 2004). They might be more 
susceptible to the exposure of the compulsory voting legislation than the median-age voter in 
Brazil. In this sense, the results reported in this paper might provide an upper bound for the 
effect of compulsory voting in determining individuals' degree of polarization. For example, 
                                                 
13 Among those are the former soccer players Romario (elected with 4,683,963 votes) and Bebeto (elected with 
61,082 votes), and television celebrities Celso Russomanno (elected with 1,524,361 votes) and “Tiririca” (elected 
with 1,016,796 votes). 
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Leon (2015) does not find such effect.14 One could expect smaller effects if the voting age 
requirement was set later in life, such as 30 years old instead of 18. Likewise, if the compulsory 
voting system was to be newly introduced in another country, it might cause smaller immediate 
effects. 
    The effects quantified in this paper are only a short-term facet of the consequences of 
compulsory voting. Investigating the long-term, permanent effects of compulsory voting and 
the precise mechanisms of influence partisanship is important and awaits future research. 
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ideology Party Seats ideology Party Seats
left  Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) 88 left  Partido da Mobilização Nacional (PMN) 4
center  Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) 78 center  Partido Trabalhista do Brasil (PT do B) 3
center-left  Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) 54 extreme left  Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL) 3
center-right  Democratas (DEM) 43 center  Partido Humanista da Solidariedade (PHS) 2
center  Partido da República (PR) 42 center  Partido Republicano Progressista (PRP) 2
right  Partido Progressista (PP) 41 right  Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro (PRTB) 2
left  Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB) 34 center  Partido Social Liberal (PSL) 1
center-left  Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT) 28 center-right  Partido Trabalhista Cristão (PTC) 1
center  Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) 21 center  Partido Trabalhista Nacional (PTN) 0
center-right  Partido Social Cristão (PSC) 17 center-right  Partido Social Democrata Cristão (PSDC) 0
center  Partido Verde (PV) 15 extreme left  Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado 0
left  Partido Comunista do Brasil (PC do B) 15 extreme left  Partido da Causa Operária (PCO) 0
center-left  Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) 12 extreme left  Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) 0
center-right  Partido Republicano Brasileiro (PRB) 7
Note: Sources TSE and Wikipedia.
Table1  2010 Chamber of Deputies Election Results 
All Voter Non-Voter
Outcomes: ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) (2)-(3)
Center-oriented 0.5362 2,952 0.4924 0.6532 -0.1608 **
[0.498] [0.500] [0.476]
Polarization Index 0.5105 2,952 0.5568 0.3846 0.1722 **
[0.586] [0.588] [0.559]
Prefers a 0.3369 3,027 0.3827 0.2184 0.1643 **
Political Party [0.473] [0.486] [0.413]
Ideology Index 0.0118 2,952 0.0183 -0.0012 0.0195
[0.777] [0.8096] [0.678]
Extreme Left-wing 0.0294 2,952 0.0314 0.0219 0.0095
[0.169] [0.175] [0.146]
Extreme right-right 0.0172 2,952 0.0178 0.0158 0.002
[0.130] [0.1324] [0.125]
Prefers PSDB party 0.185 3,027 0.2146 0.1098 0.1048 **
[0.388] [0.411] [0.313]
Prefers PT party 0.0436 3,027 0.048 0.0327 0.0153 *
[0.204] [0.2138] [0.178]
Prefers PV party 0.0664 3,027 0.0706 0.0561 0.0145
[0.249] [0.256] [0.230]
Notes: Standard deviations are in brackets. *Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level.
Table 2  Descriptives by Voting Status in the 2010 Election
N
Mean for younger
 than 18 N
(under voluntary voting) Optimal Quadratic Cubic
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
Polarization outcomes
[1] Center-oriented 0.6453 0.0089 -0.0242 -0.0333 2,952
[0.0359] [0.0497] [0.0646]
{1}
[2] Polarization Index 0.3914 0.0217 0.0664 0.0791 2,952
[0.0416] [0.0575] [0.0739]
{1}
[3] Prefers a 0.289 0.0502 0.0983** 0.0697 3,027
Political Party [0.0342] [0.0481] [0.0637]
{1}
Directional Preference outcomes:
[4] Ideology Index 0.0031 -0.0782 -0.0926 -0.2106** 2,952
[0.0545] [0.0756] [0.0968]
{1}
[5] Extreme Left-wing 0.0281 0.0216** 0.0346* 0.0435** 2,952
[0.0107] [0.0141] [0.0168]
{1}
[6] Extreme right-right 0.0167 -0.0315 0.0076 0.022 2,952
[0.0197] [0.0138] [0.0174]
{4}
[7] Prefers PSDB party 0.133 0.0531** 0.0860** 0.0488 3,027
[0.0272] [0.0379] [0.0504]
{1}
[8] Prefers PT party 0.045 0.0366 0.0288 0.0366 3,027
[0.0248] [0.0189] [0.0248]
{3}
[9] Prefers PV party 0.081 -0.0047 -0.0159 -0.0234 3,027
[0.0196] [0.0281] [0.0383]
{1}
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in brackets and optimal age polynomial order based on an Akaike criterion is in parenthesis. All regressions include
 school-fixed effects and an indicator for whether an individual has voted before. Demographic controls include dummies for gender, race and 
mothers’ education. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level.
Coefficient on Turning 18 (Required to Vote)
Age Polynomial order
Table 3  Effects of the Compulsory Voting Legislation on Political orientation- RD Results
Mean for younger
 than 18 N
(under voluntary voting) Optimal Quadratic Cubic
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
[1] "Feel good about voting 6.2732 -0.0332 0.1996 0.4682 2,895
because I am exerting my civic duty" [0.2152] [0.2982] [0.3891]
{1}
Knowledge variables
[2] Mistakes made about Rouseff (PT) 0.3856 -0.0059 -0.0094 -0.0206 3,027
[0.0078] [0.0109] [0.0143]
{1}
[3] Mistakes made about Serra (PSDB) 0.2976 0.0105 0.0081 0.0105 3,027
[0.0132] [0.0101] [0.0132]
{3}
[4] Mistakes made about Silva (PV) 0.3011 0.0048 0.0005 0.0080 3,027
[0.0086] [0.0122] [0.01632]
{1}
Most important quality in a president 
[5] Competence, intelligence 0.4336 0.0344 0.0111 0.0297 2,784
[0.1036] [0.0533] [0.0703]
{5}
[6] Honesty, integrity 0.4208 0.1612 -0.0138 -0.0032 2,747
[0.1010] [0.0532] [0.0697]
{5}
[7] Genuinely care about the people 0.1774 -0.0175 -0.0485 -0.0778 2,718
[0.0295] [0.0411] [0.0536]
{1}
[8] Charisma 0.0269 0.0701 0.0605 0.0701 2,696
[0.0256]** [0.0196]** [0.0256]**
{3}
Most important quality in a mayor 
[9] Competence, intelligence 0.4100 -0.1369 -0.0607 -0.1279 2,751
[0.1019] [0.0531] [0.0694]*
{5}
[10] Honesty, integrity 0.4411 0.3190 0.0319 0.1139 2,722
[0.1028]** [0.0543] [0.0707]
{5}
[11] Genuinely care about the people 0.1817 0.0087 -0.0061 -0.0208 2,678
[0.0284] [0.0388] [0.0496]
{1}
[12] Charisma 0.0214 0.0586 0.0534 0.0586 2,654
[0.0232]** [0.0174]** [0.0232]**
{3}
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in brackets and optimal age polynomial order based on an Akaike criterion is in parenthesis. All regressions include
 school-fixed effects and an indicator for whether an individual has voted before. Demographic controls include dummies for gender, race and 
mothers’ education. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level.
Table 4  Effects of the Compulsory Voting Legislation on Political outcomes- RD Results




White 0.0114 0.0182 3,027
[0.0303] [0.0431]
Female -0.0851 -0.0714 3,027
[0.0359]** [0.0498]
Mother has college education 0.0419 0.0475 3,027
[0.0297] [0.0412]
Lives with parent(s) -0.0330 -0.0009 2,785
[0.0231] [0.0328]
Works -0.0256 -0.0431 2,766
[0.0216] [0.0307]
Responded seriously to the survey 0.0221 0.0173 3,001
[0.0188] [0.0251]
Plans to apply to College -0.0084 0.0096 2,625
[0.0227] [0.0326]
Frequency of church attendance (times per month) -0.2259 -0.2563 2,712
[0.2379] [0.3511]
Mother has a party preference -0.0124 0.0338 2,503
[0.0412] [0.0574]
Age polynomial controls linear quadratic
Notes: The sample includes individuals between 16.75 and 19.25 years old.Entries represent OLS regression results 
including age polynomial controls fully interacted with a dummy for age 18 or older, and school fixed effects. 
Huber White standard errors are in brackets. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table A1 Estimated Discontinuities in Pre-determined Characteristics
Mean for younger
 than 18 N
(under voluntary voting) Linear Quadratic Cubic
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
[1] Polarization Index
low-income 0.2804 0.1139 0.0169 0.0299 1,071
[0.0650]* [0.0895] [0.1148]
high-income 0.5909 -0.0676 0.0677 0.0859 1,719
[0.0625] [0.0854] [0.1094]
[2] Prefers a Political Party
low-income 0.2491 0.0586 0.0400 0.0655 1,110
[0.0526] [0.0728] [0.0962]
high-income 0.3709 0.0654 0.1358 0.0768 1,740
[0.0506] [0.0705]* [0.0937]
[3] Ideology Index
low-income -0.0482 -0.1195 -0.1903 -0.2891 1,071
[0.0779] [0.1060]* [0.1333]**
high-income 0.0879 -0.1195 -0.1155 -0.1585 1,719
[0.0877] [0.1216] [0.1570]
[4] Extreme Left-wing
low-income 0.0214 0.0452 0.0446 0.0311 1,071
[0.0188]** [0.0244]* [0.0283]
high-income 0.0364 0.0164 0.0319 0.0589 1,719
[0.0161] [0.0220] [0.0259]**
[5] Extreme right-right
low-income 0.0125 0.0071 -0.0141 -0.0191 1,071
[0.0119] [0.0200] [0.0276]
high-income 0.0242 0.0137 0.0155 0.0217 1,719
[0.0160] [0.0215] [0.0244]
[6] Prefers PSDB party
low-income 0.0853 0.0507 0.0258 0.0053 1,110
[0.0354] [0.0477] [0.0640]
high-income 0.2166 0.0545 0.1268 0.0915 1,740
[0.0433] [0.0603]** [0.0802]
[7] Prefers PT party
low-income 0.0546 -0.0259 0.0320 0.0776 1,110
[0.0262] [0.0371] [0.0498]
high-income 0.0297 0.0129 0.0239 -0.0027 1,740
[0.0160] [0.0227] [0.0283]
[8] Prefers PV party
low-income 0.0836 0.0260 -0.0095 -0.0183 1,110
[0.0333] [0.0481] [0.0647]
high-income 0.0861 -0.0274 -0.0318 -0.0356 1,740
[0.0289] [0.0395] [0.0546]
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in brackets and optimal age polynomial order based on an Akaike criterion is in parenthesis. All regressions include
 school-fixed effects and an indicator for whether an individual has voted before. Demographic controls include dummies for gender, race and 
mothers’ education. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level.
Table A2  Effects of the Compulsory Voting Legislation on Political orientation by income - RD Results














Note: Circles indicate average residual outcome values in a 12-day interval. Lines are predicted from local linear regressions using a rectangular kernel and 
a bandwidth of nine months. Residuals are obtained by regressing outcome on school-fixed effect, an indicator for whether the participant voted before and 
demographic characteristics (mother's education, gender and race indicators). 
 
 
